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Between Franks and Butler: British intelligence lessons from the Gulf War 
ABSTRACT 
 
 
Lessons for the intelligence community were publicly identified in a 1983 report by 
Lord Franks and 2004 report by Lord Butler. However, little is known of the lessons 
learned during the twenty years between the two. This article draws upon two newly 
released, previously classified, documents which examine British intelligence lessons 
from the 1990-1991 Gulf War. It provides a previously untold account of the crisis, 
exclusively from a British intelligence perspective, and presents new evidence that 
intersects across many intelligence debates. This article also challenges whether 
identified lessons remained learned and begins to question the wider learning process 
within the intelligence community.  
 
‘History is a mirror to the past and a lesson to the future.’1 
 
Since its formalisation, the British intelligence community has experienced very few 
investigations resulting in a public report. The first, in 1983, was pioneered by Lord Franks 
whilst chairing a review into the Falklands conflict.
2
  As part of a wider review the Franks 
committee provided an account of events leading up to the war, including intelligence 
reporting. They also considered whether the intelligence community should have foreseen the 
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Argentinean invasion and, although concluding that the intelligence community could not be 
blamed for the lack of warning, recommended a number of lessons to be learned.  
 
Twenty one years passed before the intelligence community was again held subject to similar 
public scrutiny. In 2004 Lord Butler chaired a committee to investigate and report upon the 
subject and use of intelligence on weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in the lead up to the 
2003 Iraq War.
3
 As part of the terms of reference Lord Butler also identified a number of 
lessons to be implemented in the future gathering, evaluation and use of intelligence on 
WMD.
4
   
 
Much has been written on the lessons learned from the Frank’s report with some literature 
focused upon the impact upon the intelligence community, especially issues of warning and 
the role and structure of the JIC.
5
 Even more academic debate emerged from the lessons 
learned from the Butler report, along with assessments of the inquiry process itself.
 6
 
However, little is known of the intelligence lessons which were identified between 1983 and 
2004 and which were only recognised internally, recorded in secret reports and disseminated 
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to a limited distribution list. Two such previously classified documents have recently been 
released, as a result of requests made to the Ministry of Defence (MoD) under the Freedom of 
Information (FOI) Act. Each report examines and reveals lessons which were identified from 
the intelligence community’s experience during the first Gulf War (1990-1991).7 As a result, 
the documents provide the opportunity for a closer assessment of the intelligence learning 
process between Franks and Butler to determine whether identified lessons were being 
learned. They also offer a unique glimpse into the secretive world of intelligence during an 
intervention which presently remains outside the archive release dates.  
 
The first document to be released was a report produced by Air Chief Marshal Sir David 
Parry-Evans. Appointed as ‘Granby Coordinator’, Parry-Evans was responsible for 
overseeing all of the tasks that were required to be completed in the aftermath of the Gulf 
War.
i
 The primary aim of his report is identified on the second page; ‘to identify lessons for 
the future from Operation Granby’ and the key lessons are summarised at the end of the 113 
page document. At the time, this report was classified as ‘secret’. When the House of 
Commons Defence Committee (HCDC) held an inquiry into the implementation of lessons 
learned from ‘Granby’ it requested a copy of the report but was refused.8 The document also 
includes an annex which features a copy of the publicly published despatch from the Joint 
Commander of Operation ‘Granby’ Air Chief Marshal Sir Patrick Hine,9  the classified 
overview reports from Hine and British Forces Commander Middle East General Peter de la 
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Billière and a list of additional major studies which had been completed on Operation 
‘Granby’, including overall planning and execution and equipment effectiveness studies.  
 
The second document released under the FOI request was a listed major study entitled 
Intelligence Support to Operation Granby. The work was commissioned by the Chief of 
Defence Intelligence (CDI) on lessons to be learned from the operation for the Defence 
Intelligence Staff (DIS) and the annex list in the Parry-Evans report confirmed its prompt 
completion. The DIS report focuses upon reviewing the central intelligence support to 
‘Granby’ and identifies 22 key lessons for the future. The author of the report is unknown but 
a cross-reference with the work by Parry-Evans confirms its authenticity and suggests it had 
been widely drawn upon by the Granby Coordinator.  
 
This article endeavours to achieve two objectives. Firstly it will utilise the new sources to 
provide an account of the involvement of the British intelligence community in the Gulf War. 
As a result, it will provide a new perspective on the current Gulf War literature and contribute 
to the limited analysis from an exclusively British standpoint.
10
 It will be structured 
chronologically to provide an examination of intelligence within three different phases of the 
crisis; prior to the invasion of Kuwait, where intelligence was focused upon monitoring, 
warning and strategic intelligence; post invasion but prior to hostilities, when intelligence 
was focused upon operational planning but limited by the laws of peacetime; and during 
hostilities, whereby tactical intelligence became paramount. As a result, this article seek to 
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contribute to the emerging literature on lesson learning in intelligence
11
 and will expose new 
evidence that spans across a number of concepts within intelligence literature; issues of 
warning, mirror-imaging, interrogation, intentions versus capabilities and intelligence liaison 
are all examined.
12
 Although these concepts and their surrounding academic debates will not 
be considered at length, empirical evidence will be presented which may be used for future 
analysis and debate contribution.  
 
Secondly, this article will consider the process of intelligence lesson learning during this time 
and challenge whether lessons were learned. Lessons that were identified during the Gulf 
War will be discussed and investigation made into whether lessons were, and remained, 
implemented. Primacy will be placed upon the lessons formally identified within the two 
newly released documents and consequently the analysis will be principally, but not 
exclusively, focused upon defence intelligence.
ii
 
 
PRIOR TO INVASION: 1 JANUARY 1990 – 1 AUGUST 1990 
 
At the beginning of 1990 it had become clear to the intelligence community that the President 
of Iraq, Saddam Hussein, was moving away from relations with moderate Arab governments. 
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Iraq was suffering from severe financial difficulties due to the bitter Iran-Iraq war (1980-
1988).
13
 Following the end of the war, foreign debt servicing swallowed seven-eighths of 
Iraq’s oil export income.14 Taking account of these factors the Joint Intelligence Committee 
(JIC) studied the procurement network of Iraq with great interest and concluded that the 
country had become ‘a potential predatory power, whose victims might be Kuwait or 
Syria.’15  
 
In the first half of 1990 British intelligence monitored the growing tensions in the Gulf.
16
 
However, resources were limited. During the 1980s British intelligence had focused large 
amounts of its reducing resources into watching the Soviet Union and countering communist 
activities. The Middle East had received little attention, although some resources had been 
directed to supporting Iraq in the Iran-Iraq war. Remaining assets were prioritised in areas 
where British forces were stationed or where the UK had defence commitments. By 1990 
Britain had foregone its treaty obligations to go to the assistance of Kuwait in the event of 
external aggression and consequently Kuwait was no longer a priority area for monitoring.
17
 
The Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) had just one diplomat manning the Iraq desk, 
who later admitted failing to understand the level to which Iraq had remained mobilised after 
the war with Iran.
18
 The DIS had a few Gulf specialists in the Rest of World (ROW) 
Directorate, however they were required to cover the entire Gulf area and Lieutenant-General 
Derek Boorman, the former CDI, later admitted that the area ‘was under-resourced’.19 Even 
the continuing assessments of the capability of the Iraqi navy and air force to conduct 
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maritime operations, produced as part of intelligence support for the Armilla Patrol, was 
scaled back in early 1990 when Royal Navy permanent Gulf presence was reduced.
20
  
 
The lack of resources echoed a lesson that had been identified seven years before by the 
Franks report. It noted that as tensions between Britain and Argentina rose in October 1981 
the JIC informed the collecting agencies that increased intelligence was required on 
Argentinean strategies and intentions, but no further resources were allocated for that 
purpose.
21
 Consequently, at the time of invasion the SIS had only one officer in the whole of 
South America, GCHQ had a single analyst covering the entire South Atlantic and there was 
no coverage of Argentine military movements.
22
 The result was inadequate intelligence on 
Argentine forces and Falklands topography.
23
 
 
It is unknown why the lesson of under resourcing was not implemented, but the problem 
reoccurred in the run-up to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. It was summarised in the DIS report: 
‘since Iraqi ground forces were not considered to pose a direct threat to UK interests prior to 
‘Granby’ they were not studied in detail’.24 The lesson to be learned was identified; ‘tasking 
priorities should allow detailed analytical coverage of all areas which could generate a crisis 
directly affecting UK interests’.25 However, despite the lesson identification, the ‘Options for 
Change’ defence restructuring of the British Armed Forces and reduction in defence spending 
                                       
20
 DIS, Intelligence Support, p.2. 
21
 Franks, Falkland Islands Review, paragraph 311. 
22
 Urban, UK Eyes Alpha, p.145; Franks, Falkland Islands Review, paragraph 313. 
23
 Sir Lawrence Freedman The Official History of the Falklands Campaign (Abingdon: 
Routledge, 2005) vol.II, p.728.  
24
 DIS, Intelligence Support, p.12. 
25
 Ibid. 
8 
 
post Cold War led to further DIS staff reductions.
26
 Parry-Evans specifically noted that this 
had ‘implications for the DIS of implementing the lessons learned.’27 
 
The deficiency in resources was compounded by the lack of formal Indicator and Warning 
(I&W) systems for the ROW area in general, and Iraq and Kuwait in particular.
28
 Although 
this was a lesson which had not been identified by Franks, lessons surrounding warning had 
been examined internally for the JIC by the senior intelligence figure Doug Nicoll in the 
1980s, but appeared not to have been learned.
29
 The DIS concluded in the post-campaign 
report that ‘the DIS can warn that a country is preparing for military action (as happened with 
Granby), particularly if it is subject to an I&W system’.30 For Parry-Evans ‘The lesson is that 
intelligence has its limitations which have to be acknowledged...An I&W system would not 
necessarily have told us any more on this occasion but its formalised nature might have made 
the assessment more acceptable or credible’.31 He concluded ‘clearly effective I&W systems 
are needed in the ROW area’.32 The lesson was learned and following the end of the Gulf 
War effective I&W warning systems were established throughout the ROW area.
33
  
 
By the spring of 1990 relations between the UK and Iraq had become extremely tense. In 
March two events had worsened the relationship; the discovery of nuclear trigger devices on 
the way to Iraq by Customs and Excise at Heathrow; and the execution of the Observer 
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journalist Farzad Bazoft in Baghdad, after being convicted of spying. As a result the British 
Ambassador had been ordered to leave Baghdad and all Ministerial visits were cancelled. 
 
At the same time, Iraq’s economic situation had worsened. Kuwait and the UAE were 
frequently exceeding their OPEC quota of oil, thus keeping petroleum prices low and 
reducing Iraq’s potential income. Kuwait used this economic advantage to place pressure on 
Baghdad to repay its war loans and settle their ongoing border dispute.
34
 By July 1990 
tensions between the two countries had escalated and the DIS began regularly briefing the 
Joint Operations Centre (JOC) on developments.
35
  
 
On 17 July, Iraq’s national day, Saddam Hussein used his speech to accuse Kuwait of 
stabbing Iraq in the back and conspiring with Western imperialists and Zionists.
36
 The 
intelligence community noticed the threatening rhetoric but there was little response. It was 
not until two days later, in the DGI ROW weekly intelligence highlights,
37
 that the DIS 
reported the threat and warned that military action could not be ruled out if Kuwait did not 
accede to Hussein’s demands.38 On 20-22 July British Defence Attaché staff from Baghdad 
were sent to Kuwait to examine Iraqi troop movements. They reported substantial troop 
movements to the south and identified 17 brigade insignia. The DIS was able to confirm from 
this information that all eight divisions of the elite Republican Guard were involved in the 
troop movements.
39
 The Franks report had emphasised the importance of intelligence 
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gathering by Defence Attachés in the 1980s
40
 and the report on intelligence support during 
Operation ‘Granby’ concurred stating ‘This intelligence could not have been obtained from 
any other source’.41 The lesson from the Falklands seemed to have been learned and the 
report noted as one of the key lessons identified for the intelligence community that ‘Attachés 
can provide a unique source of intelligence on military developments’.42 
 
The US had also received intelligence on troop movements. The DIA received its first report 
of troop movements towards the Kuwaiti border on 19 July. The Defence Intelligence Officer 
sent a message to the DIA Director that same day advising the activity was ‘not a rehearsal’ 
and the message was forwarded to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
43
 The Americans 
did not inform their Embassy in Baghdad until the next day, nor did they share their 
intelligence with the British until 24 July.
44
 
 
It was not until the Americans shared their intelligence that the Middle East Current 
Intelligence Group (CIG), the interdepartmental subcommittee of the JIC, met to produce a 
rapid assessment. The report was considered by the JIC the following day and assessed that 
Iraqi military action could not be ruled out in the ‘medium term’, but that Iraq’s short term 
objective was to secure a favourable outcome at the Jeddah talks – bilateral talks between 
Kuwait and Iraq due to commence on 28 July.
45
 The CIA agreed with this analysis 
concluding that an Iraqi attack was ‘highly likely’ within a few days if Kuwait did not accede 
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to Baghdad’s demands.46 The JIC were less optimistic about the timings suggested by the 
CIG report and the minute circulated by the JIC to the wider government stressed a cause for 
concern.
47
 Despite this assessment the intelligence community were still surprised when, in 
the early hours of 2 August, Iraq invaded Kuwait, deposed the Al-Sabah ruling family and 
set-up a military occupation of Kuwait as an annexed territory. The first page of the released 
DIS report clearly states ‘Granby was unexpected.’48  
 
The intelligence community’s surprise was due to a lack of understanding of Iraqi intentions. 
Intelligence assessments had revealed that Iraq had the capability to attack, both through the 
strength of its army and air force, and also through its new positioning along the Kuwaiti 
border. However, Hussein’s exact intentions remained well hidden until it was too late. 
Charles Powell, Thatcher’s Private Secretary, later noted ‘The most difficult type of 
intelligence to have is that about intentions. In the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, we knew where 
every tank was, but we got his intentions wrong because we believed what Saddam told other 
Arab leaders’.49 British and American diplomats and ministers had believed reassurances that 
Hussein had given to other Arab leaders and were fooled by his appearance of complicity in 
the Jeddah talks.
50
 
 
The assessment of intentions also focused upon a combination of theories around the inability 
of Iraq to fight due to its poor economy, the belief that Hussein understood that there would 
be Western retaliation for his actions and that he would not wish to see his people suffer from 
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the results of Western intervention, sanctions or a worsening economy.
51
 Each assessment fell 
afoul of an intelligence trap identified by Nicoll in 1982; the ‘tendency to assume that factors 
which would weigh heavily in the United Kingdom would be equally serious constraints on 
countries ruled by one-party governments and heavily under the influence of a single 
leader’52 - mirror-imaging.iii 
 
There was also no intelligence providing a contrary view of Hussein’s intentions due to three 
key factors; the nature of the regime, a lack of Humint and good Iraqi communication 
security (Comsec). The Granby Coordinator noted that it is ‘well recognised that the 
“intentions” of a dictatorship are extremely difficult to discern’.53 In Iraq, Hussein as the 
single decision-maker kept his inner circle to a small, tight group of trusted advisors. Iraqi 
society was also closed and ruled by fear. Tom King, the Defence Secretary, reflected ‘Iraq is 
a police state with awful retribution against anyone who shows dissent...when you were 
dealing with a state as security-minded as it is possible to be, there were bound to be 
problems.’54  
 
Furthermore, there was a severe lack of Humint. With intelligence assets focused on the 
Soviet Union no SIS agents were in Iraq. The Humint which was gathered prior to the 
invasion was collected primarily through diplomatic sources and thus was heavily weighted 
towards Baghdad with little was known of the rest of the country. This was not a uniquely 
British problem. The US Senate Committee opined ‘there is a tremendous need...to increase 
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the level of investment in human intelligence and to rebuild some of the strength that was lost 
in that area.’55 
 
After the invasion attempts to collect reliable Humint continued. As the military could not go 
on patrol to gather prisoners for interrogation until hostilities began,
56
 Humint was initially 
gathered from exiled Kuwaitis and expatriates.
57
 The DIS activated a Defence Debriefing 
Team which debriefed expatriates from Iraq and Kuwait as well as members of the public and 
commercial firms who were thought to have knowledge applicable to the crisis. This exercise 
produced a large amount of valuable information which was widely distributed in Britain and 
the US.
58
  
 
A number of Humint sources were also used to clarify Imint allowing refined targeting by 
helping to identify mosques and hospitals for the coalition forces to avoid.
59
 They also 
provided detailed sketches, locations of bunkers underneath facilities, including the Iraqi Air 
Force headquarters, and advised of the Iraqi practice of stringing communications cable 
under bridges rather than under the river beds - a deciding factor in the decision to target 
bridges in Baghdad.
60
 The MoD also demonstrated lessons had been learned from the 
Falklands crisis. In 1982 there had been a severe shortage of Spanish speakers able to act as 
translators. Once hostilities began in the Gulf 93 Arabic speaking personnel and 78 Kuwaiti 
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civilians were deployed to work in hospitals and POW camps to aid in gathering Humint for 
the intelligence community.
61
  
 
Some human sources provided information in far greater volume than expected; refugees, 
border crossers and the Kuwaiti resistance provided a large amount of intelligence of value 
for the tactical intelligence cells. To aid the process of Humint collection from these sources 
the Defence Debriefing Team went to Saudi Arabia to train the Saudis to debrief the flow of 
Iraqi deserters.
62
 The DIS concluded a key lesson to be learned: ‘The Defence Debriefing 
Team is a valuable asset in emergencies and will be kept in being for use at short notice; it 
may be required to provide training assistance to allies.’63 However, the team remained 
manned by reservists who were called up on a voluntary basis.
64
 
 
Interrogation capabilities had also recently improved through the creation of the Joint 
Services Interrogation Organisation which had been provided its own vehicles and 
communications for deployment.
65
 However, for political reasons detailed interrogation was 
not permitted on POWs held in the UK nor were POWs allowed to be brought back to the UK 
for the same purpose.
66
 The DIS concluded: ‘Intelligence gained through interrogation can 
make an important contribution to the overall picture and its use should not be unnecessarily 
limited.’67iv  
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The lack of intelligence on Hussein’s intentions prior to invasion was compounded by the 
training and discipline of Iraqi Comsec. During the Iran-Iraq war the Americans had advised 
the Iraqis on how to avoid being intercepted by space based intelligence gathering and 
provided lessons on secure communications, including the use of fibre-optic landlines. The 
Iraqis continued to exploit this knowledge throughout the Gulf War campaign.
68
 In particular, 
a landline was quickly installed from Kuwait City to Baghdad specifically to avoid 
communication interception. The result was secure communications through which intentions 
could not be overheard until an SBS raid in January 1991, codenamed Operation Maude, was 
used to blow up part of the underground communications cable forcing the Iraqis to use radio 
communications.
69
 The DIS report concluded ‘a force which is poised for attack, and which 
uses Comsec well, can always hide its exact intentions unless these are revealed through 
Humint at a high level’.70 
 
Once the military campaign began very little further intelligence on Hussein’s intentions was 
gathered. At times, this proved frustrating for British military commanders who wanted to 
know the most they could about their enemy and their leader.
71
 Some intelligence was 
gathered by the US National Security Agency (NSA) by intercepting Hussein’s phone calls to 
the Iraqi Ambassador to the United Nations, Nazar Hamdoon. The intercepts were sent from 
the NSA to London where they were circulated on a tight distribution.
72
 
 
POST INVASION, PRIOR TO HOSTILITIES: 2 AUGUST 1990 – 16 JANUARY 1991 
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Once Iraq had invaded Kuwait the central intelligence machine sprung into action. The 
Franks report had been critical of the organisation during the Falklands crisis, describing it as 
‘too passive in operation to respond quickly and critically to a rapidly changing situation 
which demanded urgent attention’73 and recommending a review of the structure and the 
position of the JIC Chairman.
74
 As a result the JIC was expanded, removed from the authority 
of the FCO and placed within the Cabinet Office with the central intelligence machinery 
rebuilt by Percy Cradock, the Chairman of the JIC and Foreign Advisor to the Prime 
Minister. The crisis offered Cradock the opportunity to demonstrate that lessons had been 
learned from Franks and that the workings of the JIC had radically improved. The Middle 
East CIG began meeting at 4am to produce daily intelligence bulletins which were used to 
inform the 6am JIC meeting. In turn the JIC prepared a briefing for senior officials at 8:30am 
who then produced an agenda for a Ministerial meeting at 10am.
75
 In his dual role, Cradock 
attended both the JIC and War Cabinet meetings and the series of meetings aided in 
achieving good cross-Whitehall intelligence liaison. The Franks report had criticised the 
intelligence assessment machinery for poor links with the FCO and MoD which had led to 
assessment staff being unable to fully take into account relevant diplomatic and political 
developments as well as foreign press treatment of sensitive issues.
76
 The new processes and 
structure seemed to have rapidly improved the central intelligence machine. Parry Evans 
wrote ‘the general assessment by the Cabinet Office of the operation of the Government 
machinery during the crisis is that it worked well. One principle reason that it did so was that 
care was taken from the start to take account of the lessons identified in 1982.’77 However, 
more lessons must also have been identified at the end of the war as a new Cabinet committee 
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was established shortly afterwards to oversee the intelligence services.
78
  By 2004 Butler 
warned that the central intelligence machinery was in danger of becoming too large and 
unwieldy, although no changes to JIC membership were recommended.
79
  
 
The DIS also reacted promptly to the invasion, unlike during the invasion of the Falklands.
80
 
Contingency planning had envisaged three main progressive stages in any crisis and the 
conceptual framework was proved correct by ‘Granby’.81 A provisional crisis cell was 
established on 3 August with the first intelligence summary issued the following day. The 
crisis cell was formalised overnight on 5/6 August and continued to produce twice daily 
summaries. When military operations began in January these were increased again to four 
summaries a day and augmented by a fifth offering strategic damage assessments.
82
 Staffing 
remained relatively low; for the first six months the Crisis Cell was manned by three officers 
and three support staff per watch. Between January and February 1991 each watch was 
increased to ten officers and eight support staff. By this time, 50 percent of the officers and 
25 percent of the support staff were provided by the Warsaw Pact and the Scientific and 
Technical Intelligence Directorates of the DIS.
83
 The DIS also had to provide augmentees to 
the JOC, HQ BFME, the national Embargo Monitoring Intelligence Cell and the Cabinet 
Office Joint Intelligence Organisation. Consequently, the DIS report concluded that ‘By 
January the supply of augmentees was totally exhausted’ and in addition ‘It is uncertain 
whether the DIS (even with MoD augmentation) would have the resources to provide 
intelligence support for two simultaneous crises.’84 The finite source of sufficiently trained 
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augmentees was highlighted: ‘Sufficient augmentees, with clearly defined assignments, must 
be earmarked to meet all foreseeable crisis requirements; they should be aware of, and trained 
in, their crisis role.’85 It is unknown whether this training occurred but the lesson report from 
Operation ‘Telic’, the British codename for the 2003-2009 Iraq War, revealed that better 
training and preparation was still required.
86
 
 
The DIS also ensured cross-intelligence agency and cross-Whitehall liaison. A Director 
General of Intelligence (DGI) briefed the Cabinet at least daily, with a brief that mirrored the 
CDI’s MoD briefings.87 He also attended the JIC meetings and one of the three key tasks 
defined in the DIS crisis planning document was ‘To provide Ministers, CDS [Chief of the 
Defence Staff] and MoD Central Staffs with as complete a military intelligence picture as 
they require.’88 How this structure changed over the course of the 1990’s is unknown but by 
2004 the Butler inquiry assessed that the DIS were still not sufficiently incorporated into the 
intelligence community.
89
  
 
The immediate intelligence need was for assessments on the strengths, efficacy, procedures 
and capabilities of the Iraqi army. Unlike the advanced and detailed assessments which were 
routinely published on the major targets of the USSR and Warsaw Pact, existing assessments 
on Iraq were limited.
90
 Thirteen support groups were established to advise and assist the DIS 
in the preparation of detailed assessments and by January 1991 the DIS had issued around 
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300 new background studies.
91
 Completion of this task revealed an additional deficiency; a 
considerable depth of technical knowledge was required on a wide variety of eastern and 
western weapon systems used by the Iraqis and the DIS was unprepared for the latter 
requirement. The DIS report acknowledged the lesson to be learned: ‘The DIS needs to 
expand its expertise on weapons systems exported by the west to potential enemies.’92 
 
In reflecting upon the requirements of such assessments Parry-Evans listed as one of his key 
lessons: ‘a need for a data base, comprising both quantitative and qualitative aspects and 
covering a wide range of countries’.93 The DIS report also stated that for analytical coverage 
of all areas there should include an assessment of ‘the quality and effectiveness of a potential 
enemy, not just his orbat [order of battle].’94 In contrast the CIA had monitored Iraqi 
deployments during the 1980s and written hundreds of reports, which from the beginning of 
August 1990 were provided to the US military.
95
  
 
One of the specific areas which required immediate assessment was Iraq’s non-conventional 
weapons systems and capabilities; missiles, nuclear, biological and chemical weapons. The 
Iraqi defence newspaper had boasted ‘Iraq’s arsenal contains surprises which will astonish 
our enemies’96 and the intelligence community was aware that the Iraqi government had used 
chemical weapons during the Iran-Iraq war and retained considerable chemical and biological 
weapon capability.
97
 Collection of intelligence on the non-conventional threat had already 
received a level of priority and the intelligence community had assessed that Hussein was 
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seeking to develop a nuclear weapon
98
 or acquire WMD via an extensive international 
procurement network.
99
 
 
The Butler report revealed that a number of JIC assessments were produced during this time: 
‘the intelligence agencies contributed to a steady flow of intelligence covering Iraqi 
procurement activities, attempts to break United Nations sanctions, concealment of prohibited 
programmes and plans for handling UNSCOM and IAEA inspections.’100 On 27 September 
1990 an assessment of Iraq’s nuclear programme concluded that without significant external 
assistance it would take Iraq at least three years to establish a production capability for fissile 
material.
101
 However, the JIC also assessed that the Iraqi regime could implement a ‘crash 
programme’ which would provide Iraq the capability of making an untested nuclear weapon 
by the end of 1990.
102
  
 
Following the IAEA inspection in November 1990 the JIC produced a new assessment. It 
noted, on 4 December, that ‘We have no intelligence that would cause us to change our 
assessment of Iraq’s current nuclear capability. Without significant foreign assistance, Iraq is 
still at least three years away from the capability to produce fissile material.’103 The 
inspection also confirmed to the JIC that by 22 November no ‘crash programme’ had begun, 
but if it began immediately the earliest a single un-tested device could be available would be 
mid-1991.
104
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The intelligence community also assessed Iraq’s chemical weapons programme. The JIC had 
some existing knowledge but an intelligence report received in November 1990 added further 
detail.
105
 The JIC picked up many of the figures from this report. The Butler report also 
revealed JIC assessments were made of Iraq’s ballistic missile programme, although 
intelligence was limited. On 20 September 1990 the JIC assessment stated ‘There are 
considerable uncertainties about Iraq’s current ballistic missile capability and 
deployments.’106 It approximated that Iraq had a stockpile of around 700 ballistic missiles. 
However, later appraisals of the assessments reveal a fluctuating level of assessment 
accuracy. The Special Commission on Iraq confirmed the existence of a number of agents 
which had been identified by the JIC but that capabilities had been overstated. No evidence of 
weaponised biological agents was found, whilst others, including the effort and scale of 
progress with nuclear weapons, had been understated.
107
 The Butler report criticised the 
intelligence community, in particular the JIC, for basing much of its assessment on Iraq’s 
nuclear weapons programme at this time on the incorrect assumption that the Iraqi’s would 
only use one route to enrich fissile material.
108
  Butler also revealed that the intelligence 
report received in November 1990 on Iraq’s chemical weapons programme was incorrect on 
a number of counts and that estimates of the size of Iraqi chemical agent stockpiles assumed 
that no chemical agent stocks had been left over from the Iran-Iraq war.
109
 
 
Intelligence resources also began to focus upon military targeting. On 6 August the DIS 
began unilaterally working on a targeting study and produced over 300 target graphics in the 
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months before hostilities began.
110
 The work was promptly produced to provide the 
opportunity for UK input into joint targeting discussions with the US. However, the 
Americans decided to delegate target selection to the command in the Gulf effectively 
excluding the British from the target selection process.
111
 The Granby Coordinator speculated 
that the reason for exclusion may have been due to US Central Command (CENTCOM) 
Opsec (operation security) or an incompatibility of rank; the highest ranked British 
intelligence specialist in theatre was a Lieutenant Colonel (Lt Col). Parry-Evans observed 
‘Our American friends place great emphasis on rank and there is a gulf between Lt Col and 
full Colonel...There are obvious political factors to be addressed here.’112 
 
Although the unused target graphics were later praised by the Americans the exercise of 
producing the targeting study revealed a national capability weakness. Whilst much targeting 
work had previously been completed within the NATO area it had become clear that the work 
also needed to extend to out of area (OOA) capability.
113
 In addition, throughout the process 
the interface between operations and intelligence had been poor with the DIS taking a lead by 
default. Subsequently, two key lessons were identified. Firstly, proposals were put together to 
extend target sets to OOA operations.
114
 The DIS also identified the need for a clearer 
structure: ‘A MoD targeting programme is required and a formal structure needs to be created 
to undertake targeting on a long term basis against an array of potential target countries.’115 
Whether the programme was created is unknown but targeting difficulties continued to 
emerge 12 years later in Iraq.
116
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A different form of intelligence which was vital for the military was Imint. Imint had already 
proved fundamental in convincing Saudi Arabia to request American and British military 
assistance when, shortly after the invasion, the Americans shared satellite imagery of Iraqi 
tank movements to the Saudi border.
117
 Throughout the campaign imagery was collected 
from satellites, aircraft and drones. Although the British intelligence community had no 
access to satellite photography of its own it was fortunate, as part of the coalition, to have 
access to the intelligence available from the US satellite system. The Imint provided vital 
data for strategic planning. It was particularly significant before the coalition offensive began 
as no aerial Imint collection platforms could be used in enemy territory prior to hostilities.
118
  
 
HOSTILITIES: 17 JANUARY 1991 – 28 FEBRUARY 1991 
 
Once the hostilities began aerial reconnaissance was used. Again, the British were highly 
reliant upon US image collection, including from two new prototypes of the Joint 
Surveillance and Target Radar Attack System (JSTARS) which provided processed, real-time 
intelligence on moving targets.
119
 On the other hand, the UK Midge drones failed to provide 
any useful Imint at all. Major General Rupert Smith reported to the HCDC that the Midge 
often failed to return and when it did the imagery was usually unusable.
120
 This was identified 
as a lesson by Smith although not referenced in the DIS report or by Parry-Evans. 
Nonetheless, the Midge was soon replaced by the Phoenix.
121
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On the other hand, the British military were able to assist with reconnaissance via manned 
aircraft. Six Tornado GR1a, a new aircraft for the RAF, flew 123 night time low level sorties 
using infra-red technology to provide intelligence on force dispositions and to hunt for Scud 
missiles.
122
 In addition, a number of Jaguar aircraft were also used for reconnaissance 
sorties.
123
 These assets were much needed; the US military also had to divert reconnaissance 
assets from counternarcotics operations to the Gulf in order to meet the requirement for 
reconnaissance missions.
124
 To coordinate the various collection platforms for Imint across 
the coalition CENTCOM held a Daily Aerial Reconnaissance and Surveillance (DARS) 
conference which UK representatives attended.
125
  
 
The only difficulty for the British intelligence community was a severe shortage of 
photographic interpreters (PI) in order to examine the raw Imint and provide an appropriate 
assessment. The result was not only a large reliance on US collection but also upon US 
analysis. The DIS report highlighted a key lesson to be learned: ‘Crisis planning must take 
account of limitations on PI availability and the need to depend in large part on the output of 
US Agencies.’126 
 
Sigint continued to be exploited operationally and tactically throughout the campaign too. 
Although the UK did not have space-borne Sigint collection capability the British utilised 
intelligence collected from the Nimrod Rs, GCHQ’s listening base in Cyprus and by US 
collection platforms for operational planning. Hine noted the particular success of the Nimrod 
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Rs, which operated out of Akrotiri at ‘intensive rates’ for seven months, and praised the high 
quality of the collection and the ability to provide data in near real time through down-
linking.
127
 
 
However, overall tactical Sigint was less successful than operational Sigint. Tactical Sigint 
units from all three services were deployed between August 1990 and January 1991 but 
planning lagged behind the operational deployment making it difficult to be fully exploited. 
In addition, there was an ongoing difficulty in providing enough translators to assess all the 
collected intelligence for tactical purposes. After the campaign the DIS concluded that three 
lessons were to be drawn: 
 
a. Future OOA [out of area] operational plans should include Tactical Sigint 
elements. 
b. There were insufficient linguists to meet the many demands placed upon them. 
c. There is a need for a central intelligence management body for the allocation of 
Tactical Sigint elements.
128
 
 
Whilst it is unknown whether these lessons were learned much work was done following 
‘Granby’ to create a stronger DIS central intelligence management structure and procedures. 
However, the problem of insufficient linguists reoccurred in Iraq in 2003 and the lessons 
study from Operation ‘Telic’ concluded: ‘Insufficient linguists were available to support the 
intelligence function.’129 
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In the autumn of 1990 British intelligence began to plan psyops against the Iraqis. Initially 
British psyops capability consisted of a single officer based at the Intelligence Corps training 
centre in Kent. Eventually the British military contributed 12 personnel, although the US 
committed several hundred personnel from its 4
th
 Psyops Group.
130
 The role of the military 
team was to undermine the morale of Iraqi troops and was primarily achieved through the 
dropping of leaflets which would warn Iraqi soldiers against fighting, to stay away from their 
equipment because it was likely to be a target of coalition air strikes and offering safe 
conduct passes to those who surrendered. As the military could not fly into enemy territory 
before the offensive began 25,000 leaflets were first sent by hot air balloon.
131
 During the war 
29 million leaflets were dropped by the coalition into the Kuwaiti theatre of operations.
132
 
These operations proved highly successful and many Iraqi soldiers promptly surrendered and 
were found holding a leafleted safe conduct pass.
133
 Although the benefits of psyops were not 
recognised in the DIS or Granby Coordinator reports, the lesson had been learned; 
immediately after the war 15 (UK) PSYOPS Group was established to retain and enhance the 
UK psyops capability. However, lessons identified from ‘Telic’ reveal that greater investment 
was still required, including developing a British leafleting capability for hostile 
environments.
134
 
 
Once hostilities began the greatest challenge for the intelligence community was dealing with 
the quantity of raw intelligence and demands for fast paced intelligence assessments, 
particularly Bomb Damage Assessments (BDA). BDA was important for the Joint Forces 
Commander General Schwartzkopf because he did not want to commit troops to a ground 
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campaign until the air campaign had reduced the effectiveness of the Iraqi Republican Guard 
by 50 percent. However, BDA staff were overloaded and even when the Intelligence 
Collection Centre increased its staff from 170 to 600 people rushed assessments were often 
inaccurate,  putting at risk air crews and wasting valuable weapons revisiting targets.
135
 This 
was partly due to the limitations of reliance upon satellite imagery systems for the task; a tank 
may have moved between satellite orbits or flames would go out between one pass and 
another.
136
 These systems were meant for strategic surveillance, not tactical reconnaissance. 
 
Although the DIS targeting cell moved into BDA at the start of hostilities the UK was highly 
dependent upon US analysts.
137
 In addition, as the RAF did not possess the appropriate 
intelligence gathering equipment the British intelligence community remained reliant upon 
US collection platforms.
138
 This caused a number of problems, including that the DIS 
encountered difficulties in getting reports from CENTCOM on tactical BDA in a timely 
manner.
139
 The identified lesson stated ‘an agreed national BDA methodology is required 
(aligned, if possible, to the US).’140  The lessons report from ‘Telic’ reveals that a UK BDA 
process and policy was in place by 2003 but that it required further review.
141
 
 
More broadly, there was much difficulty in the distillation and dissemination of intelligence. 
This echoed difficulties experienced during 1982, whereby delays in the dissemination of 
tactical and strategic intelligence had eventually led the captain of Uganda to complain via 
telegram that delayed classified information meant that his ship ‘had apparently sailed 
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through a minefield off Stanley’.142 In a repeat performance in 1990-1991 De La Billière told 
the HCDC ‘there was so much [intelligence] available in the end that it was very difficult to 
cope with it and to extract from it the detail which was required at lower command levels.’143 
Parry-Evans agreed.
144
 Although this was partly the result of US organisation, there was also 
an insufficient number of trained British intelligence personnel to process the intelligence 
data. Hine identified that all three services lacked in suitable personnel; the Royal Navy had 
shortfalls afloat and ashore which were filled with Intelligence augmentees; the Army were 
eventually able to man units but the flow of intelligence to JHQ and HQ in theatre was slow; 
the new RAF Intelligence Branch was supplemented by the RAF Volunteer Reserve with no 
opportunity for roulement.
145
 At the end of the Gulf War an officer was appointed to increase 
intelligence training across all services, including the running of full scale military 
exercises.
146
 However, Brown concluded that ‘Telic’ had exposed the need for still further 
training.
147
 
 
Adding to these existing distillation difficulties were problems associated with Opsec, 
intelligence sensitivity and classification issues. The Opsec difficulties were two-fold; over 
rigorous security surrounding planning left requests for intelligence very late, whilst 
overcautious sensitivity regarding intelligence often stopped intelligence reaching the 
military. The DIS and DIA were both refused access to a number of reports leading the MoD 
to conclude ‘Opsec is to be encouraged but not to the point where the enemy knows more of 
our own operations than does the home side. In this case Opsec was carried to extremes’.148 
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In addition, many intelligence reports were classified at a level which required sanitisation 
before dissemination leaving those at JHQ more informed than those in theatre. There was 
also a similar difficulty within the coalition whereby the widespread application of the US 
‘NOFORN’ (no foreigners) and UK ‘EYES A’ (UK citizens only) classifications hindered 
cross-coalition intelligence sharing. The lesson recorded was ‘measures were applied to an 
excessive extent and inhibited intelligence analysis. Opsec must not be carried to 
extremes.’149  
 
Owners of intelligence and intelligence assets also failed to always recognise the value of 
sharing information with others. Some of the manpower and intelligence gathering assets 
were controlled by single services or commands. Major General Rupert Smith reported to the 
HCDC: 
 
The owner of the piece of kit, the single piece of kit, tended to want to use it for his 
own purposes and his staff were supporting him and not recognising the needs of 
someone and in fact that they owned the information that that someone could have.
150
 
 
The management of intelligence was highlighted by the post-operational DIS report which 
concluded that ‘Granby’ had shown the need for more effective central management of 
defence intelligence, something which had been previously agreed but not achieved. The key 
lesson identified was ‘Scarce MoD-controlled intelligence resources must be used to best 
advantage; steps are in hand to ensure that the overall defence intelligence effort is 
coordinated more effectively.’151 Following the Gulf War all assets were centralised under 
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the CDI and an intelligence division was created within the Permanent Joint Headquarters 
(PJHQ) at Northwood in 1996.
152
  However, by 2003 concerns were again raised over the 
growing intelligence structure, across DIS, PJHQ and in theatre, and the lesson identified by 
Brown was that a review was required to ensure greater ‘fusion’ between the three.153  
 
Dissemination problems were compounded by a lack of secure communications.  From the 
outset of the crisis there was inadequate communication links between the DIS, JHQ and the 
US intelligence organisations. There was a particular shortage of secure voice links to US 
agencies because the US had moved from a system, to which the DIS had access, to a new 
system which they had previously refused to release to the UK. The hindrance was only 
partially overcome by installing one new terminal in the DIS which was manned on a 24-hour 
basis by a US liaison or post exchange officer.
154
 Once the crisis was over the terminal was 
removed but the lesson identified by the MoD stated ‘The communications links established 
in Granby must be maintained and secure voice links with the US improved.’155 
 
Working with the Americans proved extremely important throughout the campaign and was 
an enduring lesson. Early on in the crisis there had been a good working relationship between 
US President Bush and UK PM Thatcher which had set the tone of relations. The JIC also 
worked with the CIA to provide estimates on WMD and Cradock had visited the US National 
Security Adviser, Brent Scowcroft, his deputy, Bob Gates, and the head of the CIA, Bill 
Webster, in October 1990. A British Defence Intelligence Liaison Staff was set-up in 
Washington with mirrored DIA and CIA representatives in London to ensure close 
communications between the capitals on strategic thinking and to provide advice on the crisis 
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management systems established and the necessary points of contact.
156
 The DIS report 
concluded:  
 
The close relationship between the DIS and US agencies in Washington meant that 
we were not only able to provide HQ BFME with a UK assessment of the situation for 
use in consultation with the Allied Commander but we were fully aware of the 
national assessment in Washington and to some extent able to influence that 
assessment.
157
 
 
US intelligence analysts were also deployed to JHQ as well as British analysts to the 
Operations Intelligence Crisis Cell in CENTCOM.
v
 There was integration between the US 
Central Air Force and British air intelligence staffs
158
 and from 17 January the US was 
approved to release BDA intelligence to the UK.
159
 Hine described the relationship as 
‘special’ and concluded: ‘The ready availability to us of high-quality intelligence reflected 
the mutual trust and rapport established between our intelligence communities over the 
years.’160 This availability proved vital, with the Americans utilising collection platforms that 
the British could not afford and providing far greater numbers of man power. One British 
analyst advised: ‘Over 90 percent of what was in my reports was American material. If we 
didn’t have the Americans, I’d have nothing to write about...In the intelligence world the 
Americans have all the cards. Without them, we’d be little better than Belgium.’161 The 
lesson identified within the DIS report also emphasised the US relationship:  
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Close cooperation between Allied intelligence organisations, and especially with 
those in the US is essential in a crisis: the UK needs to take full advantage of the 
much greater American effort...the special UK/US intelligence relationship must be 
maintained.
162
 
 
This lesson was kept in mind into the 2000s. The lesson compendium from Operation ‘Telic’ 
reveals that after 2001 UK staff were quickly embedded in US manned coalition headquarters 
and liaison in US headquarters became a full-time basis.
163
 
 
Working with other allies’ intelligence agencies during ‘Granby’ was also important; the 
Soviets provided data on the Scud missile system, Israel shared a detailed psychological 
profile of Hussein which one analyst described as ‘one of the most useful documents I saw in 
the entire war’,164 the French flew reconnaissance sorties in Jaguars whilst their Puma 
Helicopters provided tactical data.
165
 The Palestinians provided intelligence on the wider 
impact of the crisis for terrorism and insurgency and many Arab states provided 
counterintelligence.
166
 To coordinate counterintelligence operations amongst the coalition 
Joint Counterintelligence Liaison Offices were set-up in Saudi Arabia. The British also 
shared intelligence in return. The DGI (ROW) carried out briefing tours to the Gulf, 
presenting British intelligence assessments to Egypt, Saudi Arabia, UAE, Bahrain, Qatar and 
Oman.
167
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There was also a particularly close intelligence relationship with the Saudis. Early on in 
‘Granby’ the head of the SIS, ‘C’, had visited his counterpart, Prince Turki, in Saudi Arabia 
to secure a smooth working relationship and compare intelligence on Saddam.
168
 Upon 
negotiation from the British Ambassador a British Intelligence Corps liaison was also 
established in Prince Khalid’s, the Commander of the Arab forces, headquarters.169 As part of 
their contribution to the coalition the Saudi’s ran aerial reconnaissance missions and 
conducted surveillance missions along Saudi Arabia’s border and over Iraqi territory. The 
Royal Saudi Air Force intelligence personnel also interpreted much of its collected 
photography and Saudi troops were responsible for the interrogation of many of the Iraqi 
deserters.
170
 The DIS end of operation lessons report noted ‘European and Arab participation 
in Coalition forces and the political importance of [retained] proved the value of connections 
established by the DIS with many other national intelligence agencies.’171 Parry-Evans agreed 
and stated the key lesson: ‘The importance of the UK/US intelligence link cannot be over-
emphasised, but many of our intelligence links with a wide range of countries were of 
particular value, pointing the need to maintain and foster such links.’172 Following 
investigations on both sides of the Atlantic on the intelligence on Iraqi WMD in 2003, many 
of these links were revealed as retained. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Overall, the Gulf War brought the intelligence community a number of successes, including 
good working relationships across the coalition nations and new achievements in psyops. It 
                                       
168
 Munro, Keep the Flag Flying, p.221. 
169
 Munro, Arab Storm, p.93. 
170
 DoD, Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, p.394. 
171
 DIS, Intelligence Support, p.11. 
172
 Parry-Evans, Report by the Granby Coordinator, p.83. 
34 
 
also demonstrated that much had been learned since the Franks report with a restructured and 
more active central intelligence machine and utilising military attachés for valuable 
intelligence collection. However, the war also revealed that a great many more lessons 
needed to be learned, including the development of a national targeting capability and 
national BDA methodology. Butler would also go on to identify still further lessons 13 years 
later.  
 
The Parry-Evans and DIS reports offer a glimpse into the secretive world of intelligence 
during a time of crisis which is not yet outside the 30, reducing to 20, year rule. Unlike the 
external inquiries of Franks and Butler they also provide an insight into the intelligence 
community’s self-reflexivity in considering its own lessons from experience. They reveal that 
identified lessons offered a mix of positive learning, including the value of the Defence 
Debriefing Team, and negative learning, where failings were highlighted for immediate or 
future improvement. They crossed hierarchical boundaries with lessons identified at strategic, 
operational and tactical levels, within centrally managed intelligence and in theatre. Although 
the reports were not exhaustive - still further lessons emerged within the HCDC which had 
not been mentioned in either report including the failings of the Midge drone - they were 
extensive and provided a comprehensive checklist for implementation for the Granby 
Coordinator and the CDI. 
 
As part of the MoD, both reports focused upon the lessons learned in defence intelligence 
with only a few lessons identified for the wider intelligence community. The MoD and armed 
services had long since prepared internal post-operation lesson learning reports, on all areas 
of involvement – as evidenced by the annexed list of major studies completed in the Parry-
Evans report. However, there is little evidence that such internal post-operation lesson 
35 
 
learning reports are produced by other branches of the intelligence community. The value that 
such reports could provide is difficult to quantify but the changes made as a result of Franks 
proved their worth in ‘Granby’, whilst the recommendations made by the Butler Inquiry 
continue to be widely referenced and heralded as providing the gold standard for intelligence 
collection, assessment and reporting. If internal lesson reports lead to similar results as the 
external inquiries of Franks and Butler then the wider intelligence community may find 
adopting a similar practise of unending value. 
                                       
i
 The British code name for the military intervention to protect Saudi Arabia and later to 
dispel the Iraqis from Kuwait was Operation ‘Granby’. The US called the first phase 
Operation ‘Desert Shield’ and the phase of hostilities Operation ‘Desert Storm’. 
ii
 This will also reveal a fresh insight into the area of defence intelligence, for which there is 
currently no official history. 
iii
 The issue of mirror-imaging was reemphasised by Butler. Butler, Review of Intelligence on 
WMD, p.15. 
iv
 This lesson went too far the other way. The inquiry into the 2003 death of Baha Mousa 
revealed that there was poor interrogation policy, doctrine and training within the British 
Army. Huw Bennett, ‘The Baha Mousa Tragedy’. 
v
 Only Canada and Australia were also granted this privileged access. 
